Threat Intelligence
When a Web3 Domain Resolves Correctly but Sends Funds to the Wrong Person
Why a valid blockchain address is not proof of an authorized destination.
- Published
- By
- The Singulant Research
- Category
- Threat Intelligence
- Primary source
- Habr, sansmaster (in Russian)
Summary
- A Habr author, writing as sansmaster, describes a social-engineering script in which a Telegram contact told him to send ATOM from Edge Wallet to his own Bybit XRP deposit address with
-ibc.xappended. - That string is not an address. It is an Unstoppable Domains
.xname whose ATOM record points to a Cosmos address chosen by the person who registered it. According to the author, a supporting wallet resolved it as designed. - We independently read the name's on-chain record. It returns the Cosmos address the author reports.
- Nothing in the source or in our checks indicates that Unstoppable Domains, Edge, Bybit, Cosmos, or the XRP Ledger was compromised. In our assessment, the failure is at the authorization step: a correctly resolved address was treated as if it were the intended destination.
- The reported inflows to that Cosmos address are third-party findings. They are not confirmed losses.
Third-party reported findings
Reported by the source, not independently verified unless noted
The following is the author's account, published on Habr on November 4, 2026 (Moscow time). We summarize and translate it; quotations are our translation.
- A stranger on Telegram promoted a liquidity-pool earning scheme, asked which exchange the author used, and, on hearing Bybit, asked him to install Edge and buy ATOM specifically.
- The author bought 10 ATOM on Bybit and moved them to Edge. He was then told to send the ATOM back to his Bybit XRP deposit address, and, when he objected that this was a different coin and network, was told the IBC protocol would handle the conversion.
- The instruction was to append
-ibc.xto his XRP deposit address and send immediately, "while there is profit." - When he pasted the resulting string into Edge, the wallet accepted it and displayed a
cosmos1…address under the recipient field. He states that he did not confirm the transfer. - He reports that Bybit uses a shared XRP deposit address across customers, with individual destination tags identifying each recipient, and that the scheme registered the name
r4rjtVAtG3gmcDHU3nmXdYKcVSbvGPF7Fa-ibc.xbuilt from that shared address, so one name could be reused against many Bybit customers. - He reports that, as of November 4, 2026, the available history of the resolved Cosmos address showed "147 incoming transfers totaling 22,316.56 ATOM, from July 18 to October 26," and that one sender made 11 transfers rising from 14.72 ATOM to 704.56 ATOM, 1,248.54 ATOM in total. He writes that, judging by the pattern and amounts, "almost all senders" appear to have been victims of the scheme. That is his assessment.
- He registered his own
.xand.cryptonames and reports that name resolution worked in Edge, Trust Wallet, and OKX Wallet, that MetaMask did not resolve the name in his test, and that USDT on Tron did not resolve.
Independently verified facts
Checked by The Singulant Research on November 4, 2026, about 4:45 PM PT
- The Habr article exists at the URL cited below. Its machine-readable publication time is 2026-11-03T23:38:54Z, which is November 4 in Moscow time and November 3 in US Pacific time. The author handle is sansmaster.
- The name
r4rjtvatg3gmcdhu3nmxdykcvsbvgpf7fa-ibc.x(Unstoppable Domains names are lowercase) has an owner in the Unstoppable Domains registry on Polygon (registry contract). Read directly from that contract, itscrypto.ATOM.addressrecord iscosmos1xhlgtcrsyglg5wuugtp379ylwaxcssasdxg3g8, the address the author links. Its XRP record is empty. - A public Cosmos Hub node retains only part of that address's history, starting at September 19, 2026. In that window it shows 66 incoming bank transfers totaling about 2,269.90 ATOM, 63 of them (about 2,220.09 ATOM) on or before October 26. 56 of the 66 carry a numeric memo; 4 carry unsolicited promotional text unrelated to the scheme described. The address balance was zero at the time of our check.
- Three of the visible transfers, on November 4, came from a single counterparty that also received transfers back from the same address that day. Together with the promotional memos, this shows that not every incoming transfer is a payment from a deceived sender.
We could not reproduce the author's full totals (147 transfers, 22,316.56 ATOM) because the node history we could query begins after July 18. We did not test Edge, Trust Wallet, OKX Wallet, or MetaMask ourselves.
Technical interpretation
Our analysis
1. How the -ibc.x suffix allegedly works
The suffix borrows two things that sound legitimate. IBC is a real Cosmos interoperability protocol, and .x is a real Unstoppable Domains namespace. Put together after an exchange deposit address, the string reads to a non-specialist like a routing instruction, something like "deliver to this XRP address over IBC." It is not. To a wallet that supports Unstoppable Domains, the whole string is a single name. The address-shaped text is just the label, chosen to look like the victim's own destination.
The shared deposit address is what makes this scalable, according to the author. Because many Bybit customers see the same XRP deposit address, a single pre-registered name can be offered to any of them, and each will recognize "their" address at the start of it. The numeric memos we observed on most incoming transfers are consistent with senders entering an XRP destination tag, although a memo alone cannot show intent.
2. How legitimate resolution returned an attacker-designated address
Unstoppable Domains names store per-asset records that the name's owner sets. A supporting wallet, asked to send ATOM to a name, looks up the ATOM record and fills in that address. In this case the owner had set the ATOM record to a Cosmos address they designated, so the wallet returned exactly that. Resolution behaved as designed. Nothing was spoofed at the resolution layer; the record was simply written by someone other than the intended recipient.
The asset choice follows from that. The victim believes they are sending to an XRP address, but the wallet is sending ATOM, so it asks the name for its ATOM record, not its XRP record. The result is a well-formed Cosmos address on the correct chain for the asset being sent, so a format or network check alone would not object.
3. Why correct resolution does not establish authorization
Naming identifies a reference. Resolution retrieves a record. Authentication establishes an identity. Authorization determines whether a specific action is permitted.
Each step answers a different question. The name answered "which record should I look at?" Resolution answered "what does that record say?" Neither step answered "is this the party the sender intends to pay?" or "should this transfer happen at all?" In the reported case, the user's actual intent was to deposit to their own Bybit account. The resolved destination was a Cosmos address unrelated to Bybit, for a different asset on a different network. A system that treats a successful lookup as approval of the destination collapses four separate checks into one.
Wallet interfaces make this easy to miss. A resolved address appearing under the recipient field, with no error, looks like confirmation. It only confirms that a record exists.
4. Reproduced behavior versus alleged losses
Two different kinds of claim appear in the source and should not be merged.
| Claim | Basis | Status |
|---|---|---|
The -ibc.x name resolves to cosmos1xhlg…g3g8 for ATOM | Author's wallet test; our direct registry read | Verified |
| Edge displayed that address when the string was pasted | Author's test and screenshot | Reported; consistent with the record we read |
| 147 incoming transfers, 22,316.56 ATOM | Author's reading of a block explorer | Reported; partially observable on chain |
| Those transfers are victim losses | Author's inference from pattern and amounts | Not established |
Incoming transfers show that value arrived at an address. They do not show who sent it, why, or whether the sender was deceived. Some may be victims; some may be the operator's own movements, tests, or unrelated activity. Our own observations of round-trip transfers and promotional memos are a reminder of that. Establishing losses would require sender accounts, victim reports, or exchange or law-enforcement findings, none of which we have.
Why this matters for autonomous AI agents
Our analysis
An agent that pays, transfers, or settles on a user's behalf will routinely be handed names instead of addresses, often from untrusted channels: a chat message, a web page, an email, another agent. If the agent's logic is "resolve the name, check the address is valid for the chain, send," it reproduces the exact gap in this case, at machine speed and without a human pausing at an unfamiliar cosmos1 prefix.
The case also shows that the inputs to a bad transfer can each look correct in isolation: a real protocol name, a real naming system, text matching a real exchange deposit address, a valid address format, a successful lookup. The inconsistency is only visible when the action is compared with the principal's stated intent: deposit XRP to my own exchange account. Agents need that comparison as an explicit step, not an implied one, and urgency in the instruction ("send now while there is profit") should be treated as a risk signal rather than a reason to skip checks.
AI⁴ design implications
Design direction, not implemented controls
AI⁴ is developing and evaluating infrastructure intended to keep naming, resolution, authentication, and authorization as separate trust boundaries. The design goal is that a consequential action would be checked against what the principal actually permitted before it executes. This article does not describe deployed or independently validated controls. Holding the AI4 token confers no execution authority.
The scenario suggests candidate cases for a future AI⁴ interoperability threat model. These are proposed test ideas only; they have not been implemented or run.
- Resolved-destination provenance. Record that a destination came from a name lookup, which namespace, and which record, and treat that as weaker evidence than a destination the principal has previously approved.
- Intent consistency. Compare the asset, network, and counterparty of the proposed transfer with the stated intent. "Deposit XRP to my exchange" sending ATOM to a Cosmos address should fail the check.
- Address-shaped names. Flag names whose labels embed an address or exchange identifier, since the label then imitates a destination it does not resolve to.
- Cross-chain claims. Treat claims that a protocol will convert one asset into another on a different network as unverified unless the route is explicit and checkable.
- Untrusted-channel instructions. Require a separate authorization step when the payee or routing came from a counterparty rather than the principal, and fail closed when that step cannot be completed.
Whether any of these become part of AI⁴ depends on design review and testing. Results, if any, would be reported separately and labeled by stage.
Unresolved questions and limitations
- We did not reproduce the Edge behavior on a device, and we did not confirm which wallets resolve
.xnames today. - We could not access the full Cosmos history for the resolved address and cannot confirm the author's totals or date range.
- We have not established who registered the name, whether the same operator controls other similar names, or whether any sender was deceived.
- We did not verify Bybit's deposit-address practice beyond the author's citation of Bybit's help center.
- Whether wallets should warn when a resolved name embeds another address, or when the asset sent differs from an asset implied by the name, is an open design question for wallet developers and naming services.
Sources
- sansmaster, "Как мошенник познакомил меня с Unstoppable Domains: фокус с -ibc.x" ("How a scammer introduced me to Unstoppable Domains: the -ibc.x trick"), Habr, published 2026-11-03 23:38 UTC. https://habr.com/ru/articles/1103374/
- Unstoppable Domains registry contract on Polygon, read directly for the name above. polygonscan.com/address/0xa9a6A3626993D487d2Dbda3173cf58cA1a9D9e9f
- Resolved Cosmos address, as linked by the author. mintscan.io/cosmos/address/cosmos1xhlgtcrsyglg5wuugtp379ylwaxcssasdxg3g8
- Unstoppable Domains, records reference (cited by the author). docs.unstoppabledomains.com/web3/resolution/records-reference
- IBC protocol overview (cited by the author). ibcprotocol.dev/how-ibc-works
- Bybit, Deposit FAQ (cited by the author). bybit.com/en/help-center/article/Bybit-Deposit-FAQ